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Evaluating the final military phase of the Border 




The assessment of the final military phase of South Africa’s border war in 
southern Angola from 1987 to 1988 in terms of victory or defeat is not without 
controversy.  The mobile engagements on the Lomba between the South Africans (in 
support of UNITA) and the Angolan armed forces (FAPLA), saw a clear victory for 
the SADF when assessed in terms of achievement of objectives, equipment captured 
and destroyed as well as enemy casualties. South Africa’s offensive manoeuvres on 
the Chambinga River - particularly regarding the Angolan 16th Brigade as more recent 
information indicates - were also successful in inflicting significant losses of men and 
equipment and damaging morale.  However, once the SADF switched from mobile 
warfare – which allowed it to effectively engage the Angolans who had superior 
numbers – to positional warfare against larger numbers of Angolan and Cuban 
forces in well-prepared and defended positions at Tumpo opposite Cuito Cuanavale, 
the picture changed.  Tumpo can thus be regarded as a stalemate. South Africa had 
achieved its objective of preventing UNITA’s annihilation and inflicted sufficient 
losses on FAPLA. But it had not managed to completely dislodge the Angolan and 
Cuban forces from the east bank of the Cuito River. 
Introduction
Although 30 years have passed since the final military phase of South Africa’s 
Border War in south-eastern Angola in 1987 and 1988, the facts are still largely 
unknown and as a result, frequently misrepresented.   The events have been portrayed 
variously as a decisive defeat for the South African Defence Force (SADF) and 
therefore a colossal victory for the Angolan and Cuban forces; a stalemate or a tactical 
withdrawal by the SADF. 
While politicians, soldiers and the general public favour accounts of epic battles, 
resulting in decisive victories or defeats, the reality – particularly in this case – is not 
as clear cut.  British military historian Michael Howard suggests that because war is 
sporadic and clearly defined – unlike politics or economic activity which are ongoing 
and constantly evolve - there are clear criteria for success or failure.117 In evaluating 
victory or defeat, strategists frequently refer to defeat mechanisms and use terms such 
as annihilation, attrition, dislocation (rendering the enemy’s strength irrelevant) and 
exhaustion.
Attrition focuses on killing soldiers and destroying equipment until the enemy 
can no longer fight. Dislocation focuses on the state of mind of the enemy leadership, 
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while disintegration targets the will of combatants and disrupts their ability to function 
as a cohesive body.118 
Hans Delbrück, the 19th-century German military historian, drew a fundamental 
distinction between strategies based on the annihilation of an opponent and those 
aimed at exhausting the enemy through manoeuvre so that he accepts the conditions 
of surrender.119 Former United States Air Force officer and air power theorist, Colonel 
John Warden, in his five rings theory of strategic military attack, and the British 
military historian and theorist, Basil Liddell Hart, in his strategy of the indirect 
approach, indicate that one, well-placed attack can cause so much psychological 
damage as to have a decisive strategic effect regardless of the physical damage.120 The 
Prussian general and military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, cites the improbability 
of victory and unacceptable costs as additional grounds for making peace.121 Defeat 
mechanisms for an attack and a defence also differ.122   
This article will assess the engagements of 1987 and early 1988 in terms 
of victory or defeat at tactical and operational level.  It will look at the statistics 
(losses of men and equipment of both FAPLA and the SADF) and whether this had a 
significant impact on both sides’ abilities to achieve their objectives, as well as morale 
and command and control functions.  It will however not deal in any detail with the 
diplomatic and political processes which have been widely covered in other works.
Early South African involvement in southern Angola
South Africa’s involvement in southern Angola since Operation Savannah in 1975 
was driven and escalated by regional and international Cold War politics.  What began 
as a clandestine operation to assist the National Union for the Total Independence 
of Angola (UNITA) recover its lost territory, intensified over the years as the then 
Soviet Union, Cuba and several other former East Bloc countries stepped up their 
involvement in support of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
(MPLA) and the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) which was then 
fighting for Namibian independence from South Africa.123
After 1976 when South Africa withdrew from southern Angola following 
international pressure, SWAPO emerged stronger than before. It had the additional 
advantage of a safe haven in southern Angola from which to operate following an 
alliance with the MPLA which allowed SWAPO to move closer to the People’s Armed 
Forces of Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) bases.124
South Africa needed UNITA’s continued presence in the south-eastern Cuando 
Cubango province to ensure that its counter-insurgency operations against SWAPO 
were confined and that they were unable to cross into the Caprivi or Kavango from 
Angola.  Between 1978 and 1987, the SADF conducted numerous small-scale and 
several larger hot pursuit operations against SWAPO (Reindeer 1978; Sceptic 1980; 
Protea 1981; Askari 1983/84).  Although these were largely successful, FAPLA 
continued to support SWAPO.  125  
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From 1983 with Operation Karton, a pattern began to emerge, and this became 
clearer with operations Wallpaper (1985) and Alpha Centauri (1986).  FAPLA focused 
on destroying UNITA through planned attacks on its stronghold of Mavinga.  This was 
critical as it could be used as a springboard for an assault on UNITA’s headquarters 
at Jamba.  The attacks were launched from Cuito Cuanavale which was situated on 
the Old Portuguese Road and close to the only bridge over the deep and fast-flowing 
Cuito river. The settlement also had a vital airfield.
Following FAPLA’s Operation Second Congress in 1985, UNITA appealed to 
South Africa for help. This led to a merger of the counter-insurgency fight and the 
Angolan civil war and a direct confrontation between South Africa and the Cubans 
and Soviets.126
Angola ups the ante
In July 1987, FAPLA launched Operation Salute to October. This was a repeat 
of its failed 1985 Operation Second Congress.  However, it included more powerful 
anti-aircraft weapons to counter the SADF’s dominance of the air space (this made 
SADF ground operations more challenging) and other modern Soviet equipment 
never before seen by the West. This had been re-routed from Afghanistan where the 
Soviets were withdrawing. 128 Operation Salute to October aimed at the annihilation 
of UNITA in the south-east, the destruction of its supply routes from neighbouring 
Namibia to central Angola, the taking of Mavinga and finally, capture of Jamba.129 
An additional motivation for a successful attack was securing a stronger negotiating 
position at talks which US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester 
Crocker, was preparing for from June.130 
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FAPLA’s elite forces, comprising four reinforced brigades of 11 400 men, plus 
62 Soviet military advisers, as well as SA-8 and SA-13 surface-to-air missiles, 80 
tanks and artillery would make up the attacking forces. 131 The 16th and 21st brigades 
would move east from Cuito Cuanavale and then head south and towards Mavinga.132 
The 47th and 59th brigades would move south and south-east respectively towards 
Mavinga.  The 13th, 25th and 66th brigades defended Cuito Cuanavale.  The 8th Brigade, 
which was later strengthened following SADF and UNITA attacks, moved supplies 
and equipment from Menongue, 192 km to the west, to Cuito Cuanavale.133 
The SADF had been expecting an attack since early 1987 after South African 
military intelligence intercepted a letter from Angolan President Jose dos Santos 
asking an American lobby group to prepare officials in the US for an attack on 
UNITA.134  In response, they launched Operation Moduler on 13 August 1987. 
South Africa answers with Moduler
Operation Moduler saw the start of the high-intensity conventional battles pitting 
the SADF and UNITA against the Cubans, Soviets and FAPLA.  It was fought along 
the Lomba River and between the Lomba and Chambinga rivers.  One of the key 
political aims was to put pressure on Angola to negotiate with UNITA.135 
Terrain and climate were to play a major role in the SADF’s mobility.136 This 
became a decisive factor in later operations.  Retired Major General Roland de Vries, 
who was the Officer Commanding 61 Mechanised Battalion Group (61 Mech) and 
participated during operations Moduler (1987) and Prone (1988) says that because 
of the nature of the terrain, the SADF deliberately planned their operations to keep 
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FAPLA guessing and attack them where they were most vulnerable, or when they 
were least expecting it – for example at night.137 As time was a critical factor for the 
SADF, the focus was on speedily breaking down FAPLA’s morale and its ability to 
attack Mavinga.
With growing international pressure, South Africa’s operations in Angola had to 
be limited in terms of duration and objectives.138 South Africa’s leadership was very 
reluctant to incur casualties and loss of equipment. It was also highly unlikely the 
superpowers would allow the country to wage a protracted conventional war against 
the Angolans, Soviets and Cubans for fear of the fighting escalating and drawing 
them in.139 This desire by both South Africa and Angola to avoid an escalation is also 
evident in the fact that there was no formal declaration of war from South Africa and 
that both sides largely left each other’s strategic-level logistics alone.140  The Cuban-
Angolan forces also did not attempt to cut the South Africans off from their support 
bases in Rundu and Mavinga. 
Initially Moduler’s objectives were very modest and focussed on providing 
limited support to UNITA to enable it to repel the FAPLA offensive.  Assistance was 
limited to four companies of infantry from 32 Battalion, a 127 mm multiple rocket 
launcher (MRL) battery and 120 mm mortar troop and special forces.141 
By mid-August it was clear that the initial force was insufficient. The SADF 
decided to increase it to full brigade strength, establishing 20 Brigade, and both 32 
Battalion and 61 Mech were authorised to be used offensively.  On 24 August, a 
special forces team from 4 Reconnaissance Regiment mounted Operation Coolidge 
to destroy the bridge over the Cuito River.  However, it was only badly damaged. The 
emphasis on the bridge was to hit FAPLA where it was weak and cut its logistic and 
communication lines.  However, this action had no long-term military effect; while 
no heavy equipment could cross the river, FAPLA were able to move other supplies 
by barge or helicopter. 142 As FAPLA followed the highly centralised Soviet system, 
Cuito Cuanavale was used as a communication, command and support hub with its air 
strip and the only road and bridge over the Cuito River, making it a vital choke-point.
By the end of the first phase of Moduler on 5 October, the SADF had achieved 
an important victory on the Lomba, using manoeuvre tactics. This saw the extensive 
destruction of equipment, as well as large numbers of casualties, causing FAPLA to 
flee in disorder. Major Igor Zhdarkin, a Russian who served in Angola from 1986 to 
1988, details the fear and flight of FAPLA in the face of the SADF attack.143 The SADF 
had annihilated the 47th Brigade (it was removed from the Angolan order of battle) 
and reduced the 21st and 59th brigades to around a third of their original strength.144 
FAPLA’s losses included:  
“61 tanks, 53 BTR-60 armoured personnel carriers, seven BMP-1 infantry 
fighting vehicles, 23 BRDM-2 reconnaissance patrol vehicles, 20 BM-21 
rocket launchers, a sophisticated Soviet SA-8 missile system (captured 
intact), 1 059 dead and 2 118 wounded.  South African losses stood at 17 
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dead, 41 wounded, and three Ratel infantry fighting vehicles, two Casspirs, 
one Bosbok spotter aircraft and one Seeker unmanned aerial vehicle 
destroyed”.145 
Bridgland estimates that UNITA, essentially a guerrilla force and lacking formal 
records, lost around 1 000 fighters between June and 4 October 1987.146 For the South 
Africans, the G-5 155 mm towed guns and anti-tank Ratels proved to be the game-
changers.147De Vries also puts it down to superior tactics, command and control and 
use of terrain. 148
The FAPLA offensive against Mavinga had been halted without achieving any 
of its objectives. They had also suffered significant losses of men and equipment, 
which damaged morale. The four brigades, which had been defeated on the Lomba, 
were now retreating back to Cuito Cuanavale. The decision by senior South African 
military and political leaders to implement offensive plans for phases two and three 
of Moduler underlines this victory and is an indication that morale and expectations 
were high on the South African side.  The political leaders now gave the SADF carte 
blanche and authorised the use of tanks to destroy FAPLA east of the Cuito and ensure 
it could not launch another attack against Mavinga in the next year.149 However, not 
all officers agreed with the decision to extend Moduler.  One vocal opponent was 
Commandant J.J (Bok) Smit, the Officer Commanding 61 Mech, who was replaced 
during the further phases.150 
FAPLA were now withdrawing to defensive positions to their rear that they had 
occupied almost two months earlier.  However, they were still able to prepare for 
another attack on Mavinga.  The 16th and 21st brigades were deployed at the source 
of the Chambinga River, while the 59th which included elements of the smashed 47th 
Brigade as well as a tactical group, were between the Vimpulo and Mianei rivers.151 
South Africa’s turning manoeuvres on the Chambinga
The SADF’s objective was now to prevent FAPLA regrouping and launching 
another offensive on Mavinga by creating a mobile battle between the Lomba and 
Chambinga rivers and engaging and destroying the FAPLA brigades one by one.152 
FAPLA’s single brigades on the move and in relatively unfamiliar territory were 
deemed extremely vulnerable and easy to annihilate, especially while the memories 
of the encounters with the SADF and the fate of the 47th Brigade were still fresh. 
The South Africans identified the 16th Brigade as their first target and attacked on 
9 November 1987.  This was seen as strategic to FAPLA’s command axis, logistics 
line and route to the Chambinga bridge.153  Also if it could be destroyed, the 59th and 
21st brigades further east would be easy to attack and pick off.  However, despite 
inflicting severe loses on the brigade, South Africa decided to break contact, allowing 
it to reorganise and cross the Chambinga bridge  - the only escape route open to the 
brigades in the south - and so escape the fate of the 47th Brigade.
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Leon Marais, commanding the SADF combat group that led the attack on the 16th 
Brigade, indicates his mission was to cripple the brigade, not annihilate it.  He pointed 
out he did not have sufficient force levels:  he had a mechanised battalion group with 
two mechanised companies and an under-strength 32 Battalion company against 
FAPLA’s brigade and at least one T-55 tank company in a defensive posture.  The 
strength was 1:3 in FAPLA’s favour. Marais says that despite criticism of the decision 
to break contact, the 16th Brigade was unable to carry out significant operations during 
the rest of Moduler.154    Insufficient force levels were to plague the South Africans 
during most of their engagements against FAPLA in the following months and were 
directly linked to their failure to fully achieve their objectives.
More recent information translated from Russian, appears to vindicate Marais.  It 
suggests that the 16th Brigade “could no longer function as a co-ordinated formation 
under a single command”.155
Although the SADF undertook further attacks on the retreating brigade, 
minefields, terrain, weather and bad luck worked against them.156 Despite the South 
Africans’ attempts to stop them, the 59th, 21st and 25th brigades were all able to cross 
the Chambinga bridge.  Although FAPLA were only reacting to SADF actions, the 
brigades were still able to withdraw and the 59th and 21st brigades linked up ensuring 
that once again the SADF failed to fully achieve its objectives.   
However, FAPLA suffered significant losses:  about 525 FAPLA soldiers were 
killed, 28 tanks, ten BTR-60s, 85 logistics vehicles and three anti-aircraft missile 
systems were destroyed.157 The SADF also failed to prevent the brigades escaping 
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north.  SADF documents also indicate that despite the set-backs, the Angolans put up 
a fight.158  This was a clear indication that FAPLA had improved command and control 
systems and that morale was rising.
At this point the SADF was also losing momentum – an indication that it was 
failing in its objective to exhaust the enemy through manoeuvre.  The soldiers 
were exhausted and frustrated that they could not stop FAPLA, plus the two-year 
conscription for most members of 61 Mech and 4 SA Infantry Battalion in Angola 
would end in December (making them reluctant to engage in further fighting that 
could see casualties), and the equipment needed replacing and repairing.159  However, 
the time between engagements allowed FAPLA to regroup and resupply, both of 
which had a positive impact on morale.
But the SADF still had options.  These included: bringing in more troops 
and equipment and moving west of the Cuito River (the current force would be 
withdrawn); exchanging troops in line; using existing forces in Phase Four. The last 
option was chosen because officers believed that FAPLA was 70 per cent defeated 
east of the Cuito.160  It appears that the SADF underestimated FAPLA’s resilience and 
also the response from the Angolan leadership and Cuba as subsequent developments 
were to show.
The SADF leadership decided to stage one final attack on FAPLA over the 
Chambinga high ground, north of the Chambinga River. Through this they hoped 
to put sufficient pressure on FAPLA to withdraw across the Cuito River to Cuito 
Cuanavale on the west bank and open meaningful negotiations.161  There was also 
concern that after 10 December 1987, because political negotiations had reached a 
decisive point, international pressure could be exerted on South Africa to withdraw at 
the end of the month.162 
The attack, which began on 25 November, marked the beginning of the end of the 
mobile warfare approach and the start of one of attrition which defined subsequent 
operations Hooper and Packer. The delay had again enabled FAPLA to pull back, 
regroup and prepare their defences with 300 Cubans deployed in support.163  FAPLA 
were no longer passive victims of attrition, dislocation and disintegration – they were 
able to prepare a response indicating they knew they had options and how to use them 
to their advantage. 
Numbers favoured the defenders as did the terrain.  De Vries notes: “FAPLA now 
defended terrain north of the Chambinga, which was extremely difficult to attack 
frontally with mechanised forces in the face of concentrated artillery and air power.”164 
According to Scholtz, FAPLA had five brigades totalling 4 000 to 5 000 men and 
about 40 tanks, while the SADF had about 3 000 men and 13 tanks.165 FAPLA had 
good indirect fire support and as they had moved back towards their own logistics, 
they had stretched the South African supply lines.166 The South Africans called off the 
attack as an accurate artillery bombardment, dense bush and a minefield had slowed 
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them down and restricted their ability to manoeuvre.  When Operation Moduler ended 
on 5 December 1987, it had halted the FAPLA offensive on the Lomba, inflicting 
significant losses and forced FAPLA to retreat to almost where their offensive had 
started around five months earlier. However, the South Africans had not been able to 
destroy the FAPLA brigades east of the Cuito
The loss of momentum once again allowed FAPLA to regroup, recuperate and 
bring up reinforcements and new equipment and to prepare the defences at Cuito 
Cuanavale and Tumpo for SADF attacks launched during operations Hooper and 
Packer.  FAPLA were also now on familiar ground of their own choosing and their 
morale had improved.167  As the SADF was no longer able to exhaust the enemy 
through manoeuvre, it opted to deploy observers and leave artillery in place with a 
protection element to discourage renewed FAPLA attacks to the east.168  
The focus on Tumpo 
In withdrawing to the area around Tumpo, the defenders were stronger than the 
attacking forces.  FAPLA were now reinforced by battle-hardened troops who had 
faced the SADF on the Lomba and Chambinga.  Scholtz assesses Operation Moduler 
as “a victory on points, not a knockout.”169  While UNITA remained as a buffer against 
SWAPO infiltration into Kavango, FAPLA were still a threat to UNITA in the east, 
plus they now had a stronger motivation to resume the failed Salute to October at the 
first opportunity. 
FAPLA had set up defences in Tumpo composed of three layers. The first, 
occupied by the 21st, 25th and 59th brigades was anchored on the Cuatir River in the 
north, and the Chambinga in the south.  The second, occupied by the 16th and 66th 
brigades and Tactical Group 2, was anchored on the Cuito-Dala confluence in the 
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north and the Cuito-Chambinga confluence in the south. The third, occupied by the 
13th Brigade, a Cuban battalion and a divisional anti-aircraft brigade, was west of the 
Cuito River and centred on Cuito Cuanavale.  Control of the artillery had also been 
centralised.170  In addition, Angolan President Jose Dos Santos had given permission 
for Cuban leader Fidel Castro to personally take over operational command.  Castro 
sent his elite 50th Division to Angola, as well as more tanks and mechanised infantry 
to Cuito Cuanavale.171 
This situation made a further South African operation necessary to clear FAPLA 
from the area between the Cuatir and Chambinga rivers so that UNITA could hold 
the terrain east of the Cuito. Recent research in the Department of Defence archives 
has established that the SADF was specifically ordered not to fight to take Cuito 
Cuanavale; occupation was only considered as an option if the Cubans and FAPLA 
withdrew.172 The first full-scale South African attack of Operation Hooper began on 
13 January 1988.  Bridgland notes that the SADF and UNITA forces had been re-
organised ensuring that around 2 000 men and 24 tanks would move from the east 
of the Cuito to take on five FAPLA brigades east of the river as well as three to the 
west.173  
The attack focused on the 21st Brigade’s position with the objective to clear 
FAPLA from the area east of the Cuito and north of the Dala. Again the statistics were 
in the SADF’s favour: FAPLA lost about 150 soldiers, seven tanks were destroyed and 
five captured, two rocket launchers and three 23-mm guns were destroyed.  UNITA 
suffered four dead and 18 wounded while South Africa reported one damaged Ratel 
and one soldier wounded.174  The 21st Brigade abandoned its positions which were 
then occupied by UNITA. But despite these impressive statistics, the SADF was 
unable to exploit its gains because of insufficient troop and tank numbers, making it 
a draw operationally.
However, by the end of January the 21st Brigade reinforced by elements of the 
8th Brigade had pushed UNITA out.  In contrast to FAPLA’s disorder and flight on the 
Lomba, this indicated not only improved morale and ability to fight as cohesive units, 
but also better communications and command and control.  The South Africans were 
not able to properly exploit the gap in the Angolan defensive line or use manoeuvre 
tactics to exhaust and dislocate their opponents.   FAPLA were also improving their 
defences east of the Cuito through minefields and defensive artillery positions and 
conducting night operations.175 These had previously been the SADF’s strong point. 
In response,  Cuban leader Fidel Castro ordered the best Cuban pilots, about 200 
advisers, a tactical group of tanks as well as artillery and mechanised infantry to the 
front.176  To avoid a similar breakthrough to the one involving the 21st Brigade earlier, 
the 59th and 25th brigades were ordered to pull back to better fortified positions. 
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Tumpo stalemate
With the re-occupation of the 21st Brigade’s position, further SADF action became 
necessary.  Unfavourable weather and logistics delays put the attack off until 14 
February, again giving FAPLA time to prepare.177  Now the SADF’s effort was on 
the 59th Brigade – the strongest force in the centre of the outer defences – as they felt 
if this brigade withdrew, this would force the 25th Brigade to the south and the 21st 
Brigade in the north to pull back into the Tumpo Triangle.178 
With this action which saw the 59th Brigade cross the Cuito and the 21st Brigade 
withdraw to Tumpo, the SADF had almost achieved its objective. Now FAPLA and 
the Cubans only controlled a small, but very well-defended area around Tumpo on the 
Cuito’s east bank. In the fighting the two brigades lost around 230 soldiers, nine tanks, 
four BRDMs, seven 23-mm guns, five BM 21s and one SA 9.  The SADF archives 
indicate 32 Cubans were also killed.  The South Africans lost four 61 Mech members 
while 11 from 61 Mech and 4 SAI were wounded.  Two Ratel 20s, two tanks and one 
Ratel 90 were damaged.179 The SADF again handed the positions over to UNITA. 
In Tumpo, FAPLA was now sacrificing terrain to strengthen its position and hold 
the SADF off, thus buying time. In the smaller area, the SADF had to attack FAPLA 
head-on and in an area where they were expecting to be engaged. The SADF was now 
breaking its rules applied successfully in Operation Moduler of attacking where the 
enemy was weak and where it least expected to be hit.  FAPLA had now forced the 
SADF to change tactics and fight on its terms, indicating a stalemate was on the cards. 
At Tumpo, FAPLA and the Cubans now had the advantage over the South 
Africans.  Their strength lay in positional warfare and larger numbers.  They were also 
fighting in an area of their choosing, closer to their own logistics and had cleared the 
vegetation to establish interlocking fields of fire and laid substantial minefields.  They 
were unlikely to be driven out easily.180 Unable to take advantage of their strength in 
manoeuvre, the South Africans were incurring casualties and damage to equipment 
without achieving their objectives. This, plus the length of time the SADF was in 
Angola would in the long run affect morale, while its ability to exhaust FAPLA and 
the Cubans through attrition was also reduced.
The terrain of the Tumpo Triangle is worth noting.  Scholtz and Bridgland have 
described it as being about 30 square kilometres, bordered on three sides by rivers 
making it easily fortified.  The western side of the Cuito River, which is higher than 
the east bank, provided excellent citing for artillery emplacements.181   From these 
heights there is a clear view across the flat and almost treeless area known as the 
Anhara Lipanda which is about four to six kilometres wide and stretches to the start 
of the Chambinga high ground.182 
While the main focus of the South Africans’ efforts was on a direct confrontation 
at Tumpo, there were smaller, clandestine efforts by 32 Battalion and special forces 
to disrupt FAPLA’s command and control and logistics west of Cuito Cuanavale. 
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However, because of their size and small troop commitment, these did not have 
significant impact. 
Because FAPLA still retained a bridgehead at Tumpo, the SADF believed a 
further attack was necessary to prevent renewed operations being launched against 
Mavinga and Jamba.  The first of South Africa’s three Tumpo engagements began on 
25 February.  This established a pattern whereby the South Africans were held at a 
distance – through minefields and artillery fire – and not able to engage FAPLA and 
the Cubans directly.183  This meant they were no longer able to exhaust FAPLA and 
destroy their equipment.  However, the South Africans were now spending longer in 
Angola without achieving their objectives, affecting not only troop morale but also 
convincing the leadership that the initial objectives would have to be scaled down 
when, not if, the SADF withdrew. 184
In this attack, the SADF encountered a minefield, alerting FAPLA to their 
presence, who in turn directed heavy artillery fire on the South African positions.   The 
G-5 guns were unable to respond because of Soviet MiG fighters which provided air 
cover.185  Only 32 Battalion, early in the attack, came into direct contact with FAPLA 
or the Cubans.186  The attack failed, again increasing FAPLA’s morale.
The second attack on Tumpo began on 1 March.  Its objective was to destroy the 
Cubans and FAPLA at the bridgehead or drive them west over the Cuito River and 
destroy the bridge.187  Again the attack failed due to minefields and stand-off artillery 
fire. This marked the end of Operation Hooper and the main force withdrew. Once 
again, the SADF was frustrated in achieving its objectives and had to exercise other 
options to see that its gains were not reversed. A small force – less than 1 500 – plus 
artillery were left in place to prevent FAPLA pushing east from Tumpo to re-occupy 
the 59th Brigade’s positions or threaten UNITA.188 
At this point, the SADF leadership was becoming concerned at the length of time 
the troops had spent in Angola.  This raised the inevitable question of withdrawal and 
how it could be done in a way that did not benefit either FAPLA or the Cubans and 
did not sacrifice the SADF’s gains.189 This also marked a critical movement in the 
international negotiations as the focus shifted from the battlefield to the negotiating 
table. In an unprecedented direct offer to the Soviets in early March, Defence 
Minister Magnus Malan stated that if they agreed to install a genuinely non-aligned 
government in Angola, his government would not push for it to be friendly to South 
Africa.190  Although nothing concrete came of this overture, it set the scene for direct 
negotiations with South Africa amid the recognition that the implementation of UN 
Resolution 435 and South West African independence should be linked to Cuban 
withdrawal from Angola – a point the South Africans had long been insisting on. 
This shift in the political arena is clearly indicative that although South Africa had not 
achieved all its military objectives, it had certainly not been defeated militarily and 
was therefore able to negotiate from a position of strength.      
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It was against this backdrop, that the third and final attack on Tumpo (Operation 
Packer) took place on 23 March 1988.  The SADF felt that FAPLA still posed a threat 
to UNITA and following a morale boost from the two successful defences of Tumpo, 
would try to move east again. The SADF also had evidence that FAPLA wanted 
to take control of the Chambinga high ground.191  The attack was planned despite 
criticism and definite scepticism among several senior SADF officers and those who 
were tasked with its planning.192  The plan was similar to that of the failed 1 March 
attack. This would mean the SADF had to attack along a predictable route where 
FAPLA were anticipating an attack. The Angolans and Cubans had effectively used 
terrain to limit the South Africans’ options.  
Once again the South Africans were unable to close with the enemy, held at a 
distance by minefields and heavy, accurate artillery fire.  Three SADF tanks were 
severely damaged by mines.  These were the only ones lost in Angola. Although 
instructions had been issued at the start of Operation Moduler to ensure that no soldier 
or equipment fell into enemy hands, the tanks were not destroyed.  General Andreas 
“Kat” Liebenberg ordered that they be recovered later, thereby handing the Cubans 
and FAPLA a propaganda coup when they recovered them.193  
After several hours of fierce fighting, the SADF once again withdrew – suffering 
no casualties - without completing their objectives to drive the Cubans and FAPLA 
from the east bank.  This unsuccessful attempt also convinced the leadership that it 
would not be possible to take Tumpo without high casualties and many more troops 
– both of which they were not prepared to risk.  While FAPLA and the Cubans could 
record this as a tactical victory, it is worth noting that they did not follow this up with 
a counter-offensive against the South Africans.
Although Operation Packer ended on 27 March 1988, this did not see the South 
Africans withdraw from the area completely.  Under Operation Displace, a smaller 
force of around 1 000 conducted deception actions such as laying extensive minefields 
between the Chambinga and Cuatir rivers and carrying out other actions to give the 
impression the force was still at brigade strength.194  One example was artillery strikes 
on FAPLA attempts to repair the bridge over the Cuito on 29 March.195 
Operation Displace only ended in August when conventional fighting in Angola 
ceased.  Then the last South African soldiers withdrew to South West Africa.  This 
operation effectively kept the Cubans and FAPLA guessing as to the South Africans’ 
intentions.  At least 12 FAPLA brigades remained tied down at Menongue and west 
of the Cuito in case South Africa staged another attack either on Tumpo from the 
south, or on Cuito Cuanavale.196    The South Africans also used the threat of further 
attacks and their presence in south-eastern Angola as an effective bargaining chip in 
the ongoing political negotiations.197  
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Conclusion
Although the SADF was swiftly able to fully achieve its objective of halting 
FAPLA’s advance on Mavinga during the first phase of Operation Moduler, further 
attacks during the latter part of Moduler were only partially successful despite a 
campaign of attrition, dislocation and annihilation.  In this regard, while the physical 
damage the SADF was able to inflict on FAPLA and the Cubans were impressive, 
these numbers only provided part of the picture. De Vries gives a succinct summary: 
on the Cuban and Angolan side 4 085 soldiers died, while more than 194 pieces of 
armour, 92 pieces of other military hardware, 9 MiG combat aircraft and 9 Russian 
helicopters had been destroyed.  The South Africans lost 47 soldiers, three Olifant 
tanks, five Ratels, five other types of vehicle, 1 Bosbok light reconnaissance aircraft 
and two Mirage combat aircraft were destroyed.  UNITA lost around 3 000 fighters.198
The South Africans’ loss of momentum provided FAPLA with critical time to 
regroup and re-arm. When the South Africans were halted at Tumpo (Operations 
Hooper and Packer) this also provided an all-important boost to FAPLA’s morale and 
again allowed them to re-organise and re-arm.  Here Castro’s intervention was critical 
to strengthening command and control and adjusting tactics to enable FAPLA to hold 
off the SADF (exchanging terrain for time), thus boosting morale.  For the Angolans, 
they also reaped the benefits of being the underdog, by drawing Cuba in to become 
actively involved in the fight.  The fact that the SADF was unable to take Tumpo was 
also a significant boost for the Angolans after their defeat on the Lomba and rout on 
the Chambinga. The more time the South Africans spent in Angola trying to achieve 
their objectives not only undermined their soldiers’ morale, it also posed political risks 
and raised the prospect of escalating the conflict – neither of which were acceptable. 
The fact that after March 1988, South Africa was able for several months to 
continue to deploy troops and conduct deception operations around Tumpo is a clear 
indication that it had not suffered a resounding tactical and operational defeat at the 
hands of Cuban and FAPLA forces. For the Cubans and FAPLA, the fact that they had 
not been able to eradicate UNITA and drive the South Africans out of the country, was 
an indication that they would continue to bleed unless they negotiated. This indicates 
a stalemate. 
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